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HOMESTEAD VS. MECHANICS' LIEN
By

DAVID

W.

KNAPP*

I. HOMESTEADS (HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES)
"Tenantry is unfavorable to freedom. It lays the foundation for separate order in society, annihilates the love of
country, and weakens the spirit of independence. The tenant has, in fact, no country, no hearth, no domestic altar,
no household god. The freeholder, on the contrary, is the
natural supporter of free government, and it should be the
policy of republics to multiply their freeholders, as it is the
policy of monarchies to multiply their tenants."
Thus spoke Senator Benton in advocating in the United States
Senate the adoption of a general homestead policy.' The homestead
is defined by Black as being, "technically, and under the modern
homestead laws, an artificial estate in land, devised to protect the
possession and enjoyment of the owner against the claims of his
creditors, by withdrawing the property from execution and forced
sale, so long as the land is occupied as a home.'"2 On the other hand
Tiffany tells us that while the homestead frequently has the characteristics of an estate, it is difficult to conceive how the right of an
owner of land to hold such land exempt from liability for debts can
be in any sense an "estate."" Regardless of the difficulty of precise
characterization of the homestead, the need for such laws has been
recognized 4 and their beneficial objectives jealously protected in
those states granting such rights.
The desirability of such protection for the homeowner was recognized by the framers of the Colorado Constitution when they
provided the general assembly with authority to pass liberal homestead and exemption laws.-- This protection of the homeowner was
made real by the Legislature when they enacted the predecessor of
what is now Article 3 of Chapter 77 of the Colorado Revised Statutes.' This, of course, was only a step in the right direction. The
ultimate protection and its extensiveness had to be determined by
the supreme court by interpretation of the statutory provisions.
In laying down a guide for subsequent interpretation of the
statutes the supreme court stated, in an early case,7 the two governing principles underlying all homestead legislation. These principles
were declared to be,
"First,the beneficient design of protecting the citizen householder and his family from the danger of miseries of destitution consequent upon business reverses, or against calamities arising from other causes; and, second, the sound
public policy of securing the permanent habitation of the
family, and cultivating the local interest, pride, and affecRecent graduate, University of Denver College of Low.
1 Thirty Years in the Senate, 103-104; see Thompson, Homestead and Exemption Laws, §1 (1878).
Black, Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951).
52 Tiffany, The Modern Law of Real Property 1121 (1903).
4 Forty-six states presently have provisions either in their constitutions or in their statutes. See
,ppendices A and B.
5Colo. Const. art. XVIII,
1.
(!Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 77-3-1 to 77-3-11 (1953).
7 Barnett v. Knight, 7 Colo. 365, 3 Pac. 747 (1884).
2
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tion of the individual, so essential to the stability and prosperity of a government."'s
In that same case the court went farther in laying down a sound
basis for giving full effect to the statutory provisions for the homestead by saying "homestead exemption is entirely the creature of
statute, but the statute is not in derogation of the common law, for
at common law the creditor had no right to sell the debtor's land,
(Thomp. Homest. & Ex., Sec. 2, and note;) and the rule is fully
established that the statutory provisions are to be liberally construed for the purpose of giving effect to the principles above
named."71 Through the years, since Barnett v. Knight, the Colorado
Supreme Court has continued to recognize these fundamental principles and has further strengthened the position of the homestead
by declaring that the statute in no way rests upon the principles of
equity and does not in any way yield thereto. " '
Two other declarations by the court have placed the homestead
in an almost insurmountable position with regard to claims by creditors. First, the court has stated that "the policy of the State is to
preserve the home to the family, even at the sacrifice of just demands, for the reason that the preservation of the home is deemed
of paramount importance."' 1 Second, in the response to a question
whether the homestead was vitiated when the designation thereof
as a homestead was for the purpose of preventing the creditor from
collecting his debt, the court held and has repeatedly affirmed that
such purpose and the consequent result of such designation are
warranted by the statute.1 '
Thus, it is seen that the Colorado Supreme Court has fully
recognized the importance of the homestead and has constantly
striven for its fullest protection.
II.

MECHANICS' LIENS (HISTORY

AND PRINCIPLES)

The mechanics' lien is also based on strong underlying public
policy. At common law, no lien upon land was recognized.' 1 Therefore. at present, the only liens which can be imposed upon land,
apart from equitable liens proper and mortgages, are those authorized by statute, known as "statutory liens."'' A lien is defined by
Black as "a charge or security or encumbrance upon property."'7
Tiffany describes the mechanics' lien as "a lien on land and on the
fixtures and improvements thereon, created by statute, to secure
the compensation of persons who, under contract with the owner
or some person authorized in his behalf, contribute labor or materials to the improvement of the land."' ; This definition leads inevitably to the basic purpose behind the mechanics' lien. The object
and purpose of the mechanics' lien statute as stated by Lane "is to
secure to the mechanic and materialman who, by their labor and
material, have directly contributed to enhance the value of property. the security of a lien thereon to the extent they have thus
9
1
11
1"
]:
14

Id. at 370, 3 Pac. at 748.
Id. at 370, 3 Pac. at 748-49.
McPhee v. O'Rourke, 10 Colo. 301, 15 Pac. 420 (1887).
Id. at 307, 15 Pac. at 423.
Id. at 306, 15 Pac. at 422.
2 Tiffany, The Modern Loof Real Property 1296 (1903).
Ibid.
See note 2 supra
See note 13 supro at 1297.
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added to its value." 7 The Colorado Supreme Court aptly stated the
purpose of the mechanics' lien when it said, "The manifest object
is to prevent wrong to the mechanics by alienation or incumbrances
during the progress of the work. Subsequent alienations or incumbrances are not prevented, but made subordinate to the right of the
mechanics who, at the time, were engaged in working and continued
afterward to work under previous employment by the vendor.""'
The statutory proceedings to enforce such rights as are granted
under the mechanics' lien laws are in their nature equitable and
were administered by the Chancery side of the court at the time
such was in being.19 Thus, in considering the objects and purposes
of the mechanics' lien laws, the underlying public policy seems to
be made self-evident. The legislature was attempting to alleviate
the plight of the laborer and materialman and to prevent the property owner from perpetrating a wrong upon them. That this policy
is deserving of serious consideration and that these laws should be
construed liberally in order to advance their purposes and objects
and to favor those who have the right to invoke their aid was made
quite clear early in Colorado judicial history.20
Thus, we have considered two entirely separate statutory
rights granted by the Colorado legislature and the policies, purposes and objectives advanced by them. The questions that remain
are: First, whether the rights granted by these statutes will come
into conflict, and when? Second, if and when that occurs, which one
will be superior and why?

III.

THE PROBLEM

Conceivably, two problems could arise in connection with 'he
application of these two statutory provisions. In order to understand
these problems better, two fact situations will be posed to illustrate
how they might arise.
A. In the first situation, let us suppose that H, home owner,
owns a home which he has, according to the statute, designated as a homestead. Subsequently, he decides to place an
addition on his house.2 1 In order to do this, H hires C, contractor, to do the work and buys the material for the addition from M, a materialman. For various possible reasons,
2
either C or M, or both, have not been paid."
B. In the second situation, nearly the same facts appear but
the time sequence will be changed slightly. In this instance,
let us assume that H has not designated his home as a
homestead until after the work was started and material
furnished but before the completion of the job and before
execution on any judgment.
17 Lane, Mechanics' Liens in Colorado 3 (1948).
It Mellor v. Valentine, 3 Colo. 255 (1877), citing Phillips, Mechancis' Liens, Sec. 228-229 (2d ed.
1883).
515The San Juan and St. Louis Mining and Smelting Co. v. French, 6 Colo. 214 (1882).
2; Maker v. Shull, 11 Colo. App. 322, 52 Pac. 1115 (1898); Cornell v. Canine-Eaton Lumber Co.,
9 Colo. App. 225, 47 Pac. 912 (1896).
"71Presumably the problem could not arise where the work accomplished was the entire construction of the house since it is necssary in Colorado to occupy the homestead.
However, this type
of factual situation and problem has arisen in other states where the homestead was declared
bfore the mechanics' lien was perfected or where mere intent was sufficient to establish the homestead and occupancy was not a requisite. Also, of course, there is a stated exception in favor of
the vendor's lien.
22 In some states whether the unocid person is C or M seems to be very critical. However. in
Colorado it appears that it would make little difference with the possible exception of the equities
being greater in one case than the other. Sometimes, non-payment of M is caused by insolvency of C.
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In either case above, C or M, or both, could presumably avail
themselves of the proceedings for foreclosure and sale of the property under the mechanics' lien laws. This of course is assuming that
they have complied with the statutory requirements of notice, filing, etc. It also seems possible, however, from the strict wording
of his house
of the homestead statutes that H could prevent
2 : the sale
by reason of its designation as a homestead. 1
Here, it will be observed, the problem has arisen. H is entitled,
according to the statute, to his homestead exemption. Similarly, C
and 1\4 are entitled to satisfaction of their judgments for mechanics'
liens
It should probably be noted here that in order to make the problem
to be assumed that the value of the property, even after the addition, does
limit of 55,000. It might also be worthy of mention at this point that a
regard to additions concerning the actual sale, Supposedly, the lien exists
house on which the work was done.

really exist it will have
not exceed the statutory
problem can arise with
only on that part of a

4z7he";:41timate, Slft 'Civinq
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Whether the second problem can arise must, of course, depend
upon the solution to the first problem. If the homestead is not superior to the mechanics' lien when it is filed before the work was
done or material furnished, a fortiori, the homestead could not be
superior in the second case. However, if the homestead in the first
case is superior to the mechanics' lien, then the question arises
whether it is superior in all cases, e.g., in problem 2.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST PROBLEM

A. The Homestead
1. The Constitutional Provisions
The Colorado Constitution provides that "The general assembly
shall pass liberal homestead and exemption laws. ''-4 Exactly what
this means or indicates concerning a possible solution to the present
problem is difficult to determine. The constitutional provision has
seldom been discussed in Colorado cases. In Wright v. Whittick ,
it was held that this provision does not designate what shall constitute a homestead but that the statute must be examined to determine such matters. It has also been held that homestead laws are
not in derogation of the common law and that they should be liberally construed..26 ; Thus, it seems that the constitutional provision
for the homestead exemption is somewhat meager and offers little
aid in an analysis of the problem. An investigation into the constitutional history of this section has proved fruitless. However, it
must be borne in mind that at least the framers of the Colorado
Constitution felt the homestead was of sufficient importance to
warrant specific mention of it.
2. Statutory Provisions.
The Colorado statute provides that "every householder in the
State of Colorado, being the head of a family, shall be entitled to a
homestead not exceeding in value the sum of five thousand dollars,
exempt from execution and attachment, arising from any debt, contract or civil obligation,entered into or incurred after the effective
date of this section. 2-7 Other sections of the homestead laws declare
the method for claiming the exemption,'2 the fact that it must be
occupied, 2-' 1 the rights of widows,"' the method of levy when the
value exceeds the five thousand dollar limit,1 the fact that the
homestead is not valid against a vendor's lien ,32 and other matters
not directly concerned with this problem.
It is interesting to note that there is a specific exception to the
homestead exemption, namely, the vendor's lien, and that exception
is the sole stated exception. Therefore any other exception must
necessarily be implied.
24 Coo.

Const.

art. XVIII,

§ 1.

25 18 Colo. 54, 31 Pa. 490 (1892).
26 Edson-Keither & Co. v. Bedwell, 52 Colo. 310, 122 Pac. 392 (1913); Martin v. Bond, 14 Colo.
466, 24 Pac. 326 (1891).
27 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 77-3-1 (1953).
28 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 77-3-2 (1953).
29 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 77-3-3 (1953).
30 Colo. Rev. Stat.
77-3-4 (1953).
31 Colo. Rev. Stat.§ 77-3-6 (1953).
32 Colo. Rev. Stat.§ 77-3-7 (1953).
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In looking at the statute declaring a right to homestead, a few
words and phrases stand out and might possibly indicate a solution
to the problem. Note that the homestead is exempt from "execution
and attachment." There are two different theories in regard to the
operation and effect of the homestead statute upon the liens of
judgments.3r: One theory is that no lien attaches at all, and the other
is that the lien attaches but is in abeyance so long as the requirements of the homestead statute are complied with. The first theory
is the one that has been adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court. :4
From this it could be reasoned that no lien will attach regardless
of how it arose, whether it was by obtaining a judgment or by complying with the mechanics' lien laws.
It should also be noted that the statute declares the homestead
to be exempt from "any debt, contract, or civil obligation." This
particular wording was discussed in an early Colorado case, - and
as might be suspected the language was held to be sufficiently
broad and comprehensive to embrace any and all forms of indebtedness. This would appear to exclude any argument that the mechanics' lien is a peculiar type of obligation which will defeat the
operation of the homestead exemption statute. One more thing regarding the homestead statutory provisions must be noted in any
discussion on this topic. Nowhere in the homestead laws of Colorado
is there stated an excep t ion in favor of the mechanics' lien. This
will be discussed in greater detail when the laws of other states are
examined. The most logical conclusion that can be drawn at this
point, however, is that the statutory construction theory of "expressio wnius est exclusio alterius" applies and that the expression of
an exception in favor of only the vendor, and of no others, precludes any other exception from being implied.
At this point it may seem to some to be ridiculous even to consider the possibility that a mechanics' lien might be superior to and
operate against a prior recorded homestead. This does not appear
to be so ridiculous, however, when one considers the statements of
supreme courts of several other states, to the effect that homesteads
and exempted property under homestead laws are liable the same
as other property, the law deeming it more equitable to protect the
mani who puts his labor or money into the property than to preserve
it for the family.' "
B. The Mechanics' Lien
1. ConstitutionalProvisions.
There is no provision for a mechanics' lien in the Colorado Constitution. Any possible indication as to a solution of this problem,
based upon the absence of a constitutional provision for mechanics'
liens seems tenuous to say the least. In a problem such as this, however. every point should be considered; and it seems that possibly
the framers of the Colorado Constitution, while feeling that the
homestead was of sufficient importance to require a specific provi:. Woodward v. People's Nat'l Bank, 2 Colo. App. 369, 31 Pac. 184 (1892).
::4 Barnett v. Knight, 7 Colo. 365, 3 Pac. 747 (1884).
:.-- See note 33 supra.
::6 See, e.g., Tyler v. Jewett, 82 Ala. 93, 2 So. 905 (1887); McAnally v. Hawkins Lumber Co.,
109 Alo. 397, 19 So. 417 (1896); Anderson v. Seamans, 49 Ark. 475, 5 S.W. 799 (1887); Murray
v. Ropley, 30 Ark. 568 (1881); Parsons v. Pearson, 9 Wash. 48, 36 Pac. 974 (1894).

8
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sion in the Constitution, felt that the mechanics' lien was not of the
same importance.
2. Statutory Provisions.
Basically the Colorado statutes give the mechanic, materialman,
etc., a lien upon property upon which they have bestowed labor or
for which they have furnished materials equal to the value of such
labor or material." One statutory provision which seems to have a
possible connection with the instant problem is the section regarding priority of lien and attachment.-", Some of the more important
provisions of this section are that:
(1) All liens established by virtue of the mechanics' lien statutes relate back to the time of the commencement of the
work or the furnishing of the materials.
(2) All such liens have priority over any and every lien or
encumbrance subsequently intervening, and,
(3) Nothing in the mechanics' lien laws should be construed
as impairing any valid encumbrance already existing at
the time the lien relates back to.
The first and second of these have greater application to the second
of the posed problems. In the first problem the time of attachment
of the mechanics' lien is not important; whether it will attach at
all is the important consideration.
The third point, however, seems to be of some importance when
one considers that courts sometimes classify the homestead exemption as a lien or encumbrance on the property.1 t Therefore, if one
considers the homestead as a lien ,4 it seems it could be argued that
the mechanics' lien could not impair that lien. Of course, it could
also be argued that the legislature did not intend this type of lien
but rather the conventional type of lien. At any rate this does not
appear to offer a clear-cut answer.
Other provisions of the mechanics' lien statute which might
offer some indication of a solution are those sections relating to the

procedure to perfect such liens and to satisfy such judgments. One
section prescribes a procedure for summons, hearing, etc., wherein
an actual judgment is rendered establishing such lien. 41 Another
section prescribes that satisfaction of these judgments shall be obtained in the manner provided for sales of real estate on execution
issued out of any court of record. 42 The importance of these provisions is that they seem to tie in the idea that an actual judgment
must be rendered and that foreclosure of such follows the same
rules as other judgments. Therefore, it seems arguable that a judgment of a mechanics' lien stands in no better position than any
other judgment and thus must be subject to a valid homestead
exemption.
The mechanics' lien laws, like the homestead laws, contain no
exception in favor of the homestead. Whether the absence of an
exception in the mechanics' lien statutes carries the same import
1,7 Colo.

Rev. Stat.
86-3-1 (1953).
Coo. Rev. Stat.
86-3-6 (1953).
:1.) E.g. Wallace v. First Nat'l Bank, 125 Colo. 584, 246 P.2d 894 (1952); Union Nat'l Bank v.
Wright, 78 Colo. 346, 242 Pac. 54 (1925), where it was held that in estate proceedings, the homestead is a lien on the home to which an heir or devisee succeeding to the title takes subiect.
4() This appears questionable since, as was pointed out before, the homestead seems to defy
accurate classification for all purposes.
41 Colo. Rev. Stat. ' 86-3-13 (1953).
4" Cola Rev. Stat. § 86-3-14 (1953).
1'
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as the absence of an exception in the homestead statutes seems open
to question. Here again we have various words, phrases, etc., that
seem either to favor or to disfavor the superiority of the mechanics'
lien over the homestead. Again, there is no clear-cut answer.
C. The General Rule
The general rule for the situation posed in problem No. 1 is
easily found but actually is of little help. It was accurately stated
as far back as 1918, when it was declared that "the right to a mechanics' lien upon a homestead is governed almost exclusively by
a statutory or constitutional provision, or both. The contemporary
constitutional and statutory provisions should therefore be consulted in any investigation of this question. ' 43 Some authorities
have been content merely to state the general rule and then give
some examples of constitutional or statutory provisions and their
effects on the decision. A typical example of this is a statement to
the effect that "under some constitutional and statutory provisions
property held exempt from ordinary debts as a homestead is not
subject to a mechanics' lien . . ." and next it is stated, "on the other

hand, under other constitutions and statutes, such homestead property is subject to a mechanics' lien the same as other property . . .41
A few authorities go farther than this and declare not only the
standard general rule regarding the constitutional and statutory
provisions but attempt to formulate a rule for situations in which
it is not clearly expressed in the constitution or statutes whether
there is an exception of one or the other. These authorities are, however, not only few in number, but seem to be fairly evenly divided
as to what the rule should be. William M. Rockel in his treatise on
mechanics' liens says, "Homesteads and exempted property under
homestead laws are liable the same as other property, the law deeming it more equitable to protect the man who puts his labor or
money into the property, than to preserve it for the family. 4 - He
fur'her states that "the intent to exempt this property from the operation of the mechanics' lien law must be expressly declared by
the statute or the constitution.

' 46

Another authority says "where a

lien is given on 'all buildings' and there is nothing in the homestead
or other acts exempting it, the property will be liable to this lien."4
4::Annot., 1918D L.R.A. 1055.
44 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 14 (1948).
4.7,
Rockel, Mechanics' Liens 22 (1909).
4-; Id.

at 10.

47 Phillips, Mechanics' Liens § 183a (2d ed. 1883).
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The contrary opinion has been declared by other authorities,
however, equally confident of their correctness. After stating the
general rule as explained above, the author of an annotation on this
subject said "where there is a general exemption of homesteads in
order that the homestead be subject to a mechanics' or materialmans' lien, there must be some provision taking such liens out of
the exemption; in the absence of such a provision the homestead is
not subject to the lien. '48 This author was not a voice alone, for we
find others expressing this same truism. "Where the statute creating
the homestead exemption contains no exception in favor
49 of mechanics, there can be no mechanics' lien on a homestead.
Upon final analysis of the views of these authorities on this
subject little can be said but that they are very definitely in conflict. Further analysis, which will be accomplished later in this
article, of the cases upon which these authorities base their opinions
will perhaps draw them closer together. Even then, however, complete accord appears impossible.
D. Other States
A brief discussion of the constitutional and statutory provisions
of other states seems to be in order at this point. 50 Twenty-eight
states have a constitutional provision for a homestead exemption or
something similar.5 1 Of those twenty-eight, eighteen have very
specific provisions regarding the homestead. These provisions include the value, size, exactly what the homestead is or is not exempt
from and various other details regarding the homestead. Seven
states have a general provision which designates that the legislature
shall recognize the right of a debtor 52 or that the legislature shall
provide for the exemption of a reasonable amount of real property. 53 Two other states have the same provision as Colorado.

4

Of these same twenty-eight states, seventeen have a limitation
of some sort imposed on the exemption. This limitation is either in
the same provision or in an accompanying one. Ten of these states
have specific exceptions in favor of the mechanics' and materialmens' liens. Six have an express exception in favor of only mechanics or laborers. However, on occasion courts have implied the
exception for the materialmen in these provisions. 5 5 One state
merely has a provision stating that the legislature can provide for
waiver, alienation, and encumbrance of the homestead. 56 Neither
of the states which have similar provisions to Colorado's have exceptions in their constitutions.
Forty-four states have some kind of a statutory provision for
the homestead exemption. Again, these do not always call the exemption a homestead by name but rather may merely designate it
as an exemption for real property. Thirty-four of these states have
an express exception in favor of the mechanics' and materialmen's
liens. This exception is sometimes in the homestead section and
48See note 43 supra.
49 Boisot, Mechanics' Liens 136 (1897).
50 For a detailed analysis of the provisions of the states, see Appendices A and B.
51 Some states do not call the exemption a homestead, but merely call it an exemption of real
property.
52 See, e.g., Indiona, Appendix A.
53 See, e.g., Maryland, Appendix A.
54 Montana and Illinois.
55 See, e.g., Anderson v. Seamans, 49 Ark. 475, 5 S.W. 799 (1887).
56 See, e.g., Ga., Appendix A.
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sometimes in the mechanics' lien section. 7 In those states which
do not expressly except the materialman, the courts have usually
implied such an exception.58 Four states which do not have a statutory exception in favor of the mechanics' liens have a constitutional
exception. One state has an exception stated in the mechanics' lien
laws running in favor of the homestead.19 Both states which have a
provision similar to that of Colorado, have a statutory exception
for the mechanics' lien.
Of the forty-six states which have a homestead or similar provision in either the constitution or statutes, there are only five which
do not have a stated exception in either the constitution or statutes."" Decisions in these states which might be relevant to a solution to this problem will be discussed in the next section.
It is difficult to say whether these statistics indicate any actual
solution to the problem. The statistics do seem, at least, to point out
the advisability of enacting a statute declaring that the exception
either does or does not exist. It also seems possible to reason that
since so many states have exceptions in favor of the mechanics'
liens, apparently they felt it was necessary to enact a statute to that
effect and that otherwise the mechanics' lien would not be superior
to the homestead. South Dakota seemed to feel the opposite was
necessary, i.e., that the mechanics' lien was not superior. In view of
South Dakota's case history on this point, which will be discussed
later, this is understandable and does not detract from the idea
that if there is going to be an exception, either the constitution
must be amended or a law passed to that effect.
E. Cases and Reasoning
A study of the cases on this problem necessarily includes consideration of the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.
It would be helpful, of course, if some state had the exact or even
similar constitutional and statutory provisions as Colorado. Unfortunately this is not the case.
As was pointed out in the preceding section, some states have
detailed constitutional provisions for the homestead exemption. 61
In some of those provisions is a stated exception in favor of persons
with liens for improvements.62 There seems to be no question in
such a situation but that there is a legitimate exception in favor of
the mechanics' lien.
In other states, however, there is no stated exception in the
constitution. In some of these states the legislatures have attempted
to provide such an exception by statute.1 3 It appears that whenever
this was questioned the statutory exception was held invalid.6 " An
attempt to enact this type of legislation brought about an interesting sequence of events in South Dakota. Originally the homestead
in South Dakota was specifically stated to be subject to a mechanics' lien. Later the homestead law was amended, and the South
Dakota Supreme Court held that the amendment, being repugnant
57 See, 'e.g., Vt., Appendix B, "This chapter shall apply to homesteads."
5 See, e.g., Banner v. Minnier, 13 Mont. 269, 34 Pac. 30 (1893).
59 S. D., S.D.C. 39-0702 (1939).
60 Colo., N. Y., Mo., Utah and Mass.
61 See, e.g., Fla.,Appendix A.
62 Ibid.
63 S.D., Ill.,
Minn., Ind.,Md., Wisc. and Utah have attempted this.
64 This question was raised in Minn., S.D.,and Utah.
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to the clause subjecting homesteads to mechanics' liens, by implication repealed the clause 5 Even later the homestead laws were
again amended so that the homestead was to be subject to the mechanics' lien. This was in turn questioned, and the court followed
the earlier case and held this provision to be unconstitutional and
void. 6 6 Subsequent efforts to amend the constitution were unsuccessful. Finally the South Dakota Legislature, apparently convinced
that any further efforts to subject the homestead to a mechanics'
lien would be unsuccessful, decided to clarify the whole situation
and passed a statute declaring that the mechanics' lien does not ex7
tend to nor affect the homestead.
Minnesota was somewhat more successful in dealing with the
problem. Like South Dakota, the Minnesota Supreme Court in
Coleman v. Ballandi s declared that any change in the homestead
laws would have to come by constitutional amendment. Unlike
South Dakota, the Minnesota Legislature was able to enact such an
amendment.69
A third state where the question arose was Utah. There, in
Volker-Scowcroft Lumber Co. v. Vance,7 the court held a statute
which proposed to subject the homestead to a mechanics' lien to be
unconstitutional and void. These appear to be the only states where
such legislation has been questioned.
Another approach that has been applied successfully in a few
instances is to subject the homestead to a mechanics' lien by implication. While generally this approach has been unsuccessful, it
has worked and apparently is still the law in Missouri. 71 This same
theory was applied in Kentucky prior to the enactment of a statute
subjecting the homestead to the operation of the mechanics' lien.
In Robards v. Robards7'2 the court said, "Assuming that the allegations of appellant in regard to her claim of homestead were sufficient, we do not think she was entitled to it as against the claim of
appellee. Having induced him to improve the land, and then (as he
contended) violated the contract to convey, she cannot defeat his
lien for the enhanced value of the land by her claim of homestead."'
It appears somewhat questionable whether the court was applying
a principle of implied exception or estoppel. This approach was also
successful in a South Carolina case where a homestead was held to
be subject to execution for a mechanics' lien even though the statute granting the right to enforce such a lien was not passed until
73
after the creation of the lien.

The cases holding such an exception to be implied seem to be
decidely in the minority. An Oregon court in holding that it would
not imply such an exception said that "if the homestead laws contain no exception in favor of debts created in making improvements,
the court can make none; and the homestead is liable only for such
65 O'Leary v. Croghan, 42 S.D. 210, 173 N.W. 844 (1919). where the court held that any change
in the homestead law would have to come by constitutional amendment.
66 Home Lumber Co. v. Heckel, 67 S.D. 429, 293 N.W. 549 (1940). It is interesting to note that
in this case the homestead was asserted against the builder of the house. The fact that S.D. requires
only intent to occupy, if manifested to the builder, made this possible.
67 S. D., S.D.C. 39.0707 (1939).
6i 22 Minn. 144 (1875).
(;' Minn. Const. art. I, Sec. 12.
71)32 Utah 74, 88 Pac. 896 (1907).
71 Kansas City Granite v. Jordan, 316 Mo. 1118, 295 S.W. 763 (1927).
72 27 Ky. L. Rep. 494, 85 S.W. 718 (1905).
73 Allen v. Harley, 3 S.C. 412 (1862).

1963

HOMESTEAD V. MECHANICS' LIENS

a lien when the exemption is waived in favor of it, which must be
by the signature of the husband and wife to the contract. 7 4 Other
states have followed this reasoning. South Dakota, while holding
one of the statutes unconstitutional and void, went further and refused to imply the exception.7a Michigan, before it enacted a statutory exception, refused to imply one in Burtch v. McGibbon.7
Other states have applied a limited form of this implication
theory. That is, in several states there were stated exceptions, but
only in favor of mechanics and laborers. The question arose when
a materialman claimed a lien on the homestead. The courts seem to
be fairly well split on this question. In a Montana case, the court
77
held the materialman to be impliedly included in the exception.
A California court held otherwise than in the above Montana case,
holding that their statute was not as broad as the Montana statute
and did not include one furnishing material.7 s In states where only
a statutory homestead provision exists, there seems to be no diffi7
culty in enacting another statute excepting the mechanics' liens. 1
Other theories have emerged in various cases regarding the
homestead as a subject of the mechanics' lien. It has been held that
the equity of a mechanic is similar to that of a vendor.," This theory
was advanced by Thompson in his work on homesteads and exemptions, where he said that there is no difference in principle between
a debt due to A, who has provided me with the land on which I
have erected my building, and a debt due to B, who has furnished
the materials to build it, and a debt due to C, whose labor has built
it." Other courts have used the estoppel principle to hold the homestead subject to a mechanics' lien.12 Still
others require the signa8
ture of both the husband and the wife. 3
F. Colorado Cases
McPhee v. O'Rourke14 seems to be the only Colorado case in
which both the homestead and mechanics' lien were mentioned in
74 Davis v. Low, 66 Ore. 599, 135 Pac. 314 (1913).
75 Fallihee v. Wittmayer, 9 S.D. 479, 70 N.W. 642 (1897).
7698 Mich. 139, 56 N.W. 1110 (1893).
77 Bonner v. Minnear, 13 Mont. 269, 34 Poc. 30 (1893).
78 Richards v. Shear, 70 Cal. 187, 11 Pac. 607 (1886).
791There are presently 12 states which have no constitutional exception for the mechanics' lien
but do have both a statutory provision fo the homestead and a statutory exception in favor of
the mechanics' lien.
SO Hill v. LaCrosse & Mil. R.R., 14 Wis. 315 (1861).
.qt Thompson, Homestead and Exemption Laws, Sec. 312 (1878).
.'- Jensen v. Griffin, 41 S.D. 30, 168 N.W. 764; 46 S.D. 55, 190 N.W. 319 (1922).
S3 See Mich. Compiled Laws of 1948 Sec. 26.282.
,S4 McPhee v. O'Rourke, 10 Colo. 301, 15 Pac. 420 (1887).
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the same case. The only difficulty is that there was actually no
mechanics' lien filed. In this case McPhee, the materialman, furnished materials used in improvements on the property. McPhee
did not comply with the mechanics' lien laws and hence had no mechanics' lien. He did bring suit on the debt for the materials and
obtained a judgment prior to the filing of a homestead. One of the
questions before the court was whether the act of designating the
property as a homestead should operate against a debt for materials
used in improvements on the property before it was so designated.
To this the court answered, "it is sufficient to say that there is no
proviso in the statute against such operation. By failing to take the
steps necessary to secure a lien upon the premises, under the provisions of our mechanics' lien act the right to subject the premises
to such debt was lost." It must be noted, however, that a mechanics'
lien was not filed, and any statement regarding the filing of a mechanics' lien is necessarily dictum. It must also be noted that in
the McPhee case the homestead was filed prior to attachment.
Whether the court was hinting that a mechanics' lien would be
superior regardless of time or that, in this case, it would be superior
since it would have been prior to the homestead seems to be questionable. The question of whether it really would have been prior
in time will be discussed in the analysis of the second problem. At
any rate, exactly why the filing of a mechanics' lien would have
made McPhee's position better does not seem clear.
Other Colorado cases have dealt with various types of liens
attaching to the homestead. The general rule usually applied is that
"in a conflict between a homestead entry claimant and another
lienor, the controlling factor, as we perceive the revelation, is that
if the lien which the homestead entryman would supplant precedes
in time of record and is specific and definite as to the property involved, it holds its preference."' 5 This, of course, is the same rule
consistently applied by the Colorado Supreme Court when considering the superiority of a judgment lien over the homestead. That is,
until there is an actual levy, the lien is not specific and will not
operate against a homestead which was filed after judgment but
prior to levy.," The real question here, however, seems never to
have been raised. That is, even if the homestead is declared long
prior to the supplying of labor and materials, will the mechanics'
lien be superior by reason of implied exception, estoppel, equity,
etc., or are the mechanic and materialman on the same footing as
the other creditors?
Other decisions in Colorado relate primarily to the question of
priority in time. The question of the equities of particular liens
does not seem to have been raised. Thus far the only lien given
priority based on its nature is the vendor's lien, and that is done by
8 7
statute.
This in itself may provide argument for the superiority of
the homestead. That is, had the legislature felt the mechanics' lien
claimants were entitled to greater rights than other lien claimants
they would have so provided.
85 Bean v. Eves, 92 Colo. 339, 20 P.2d 544 (1933).
86 Barnett v. Knight, 7 Colo. 365, 3 Pac. 747 (1884).
87 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 77-3-7 (1953).
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G. Conclusion on Problem No. 1
In coming to some conclusion on this problem, it is perhaps wise
to consider some of the arguments raised earlier in this paper. There
seems to be nothing in the wording of the statutes which would,
beyond any question, dictate an answer. Both statutes have provisions which seem possibly to exclude the other. The homestead applies to all debts, contracts, and civil obligations. This would seem
to include mechanics' liens. The mechanics' lien laws do not except
the homestead from its operation. However, the mechanics' lien
must come to judgment and attach the same as other judgments.
Therefore, why should it be different from other judgments? The
general rule as mentioned earlier offers little help.
Cases from other states, however, seem to offer some help; but
it must be remembered that none of the other states have the same
constitutional and statutory provisions as Colorado. Some have implied the exception for a mechanics' lien, and some have not. Those
states where the exception could not be implied and could not even
be enacted into the statutes probably carry little weight, as the constitutional provision in each case was very specific and explicit. As
was stated, any change would have to come by constitutional
amendment.
Colorado cases seem to be of little, if any, help. The McPhee
case could perhaps be used in argument for both sides. However, it
seems to be a better argument for the superiority of the homestead
if filed prior to the furnishing of materials.
The statistics of what other states have done also seems to carry
some weight for the homestead. However, this could be discounted
somewhat by South Dakota's precedent of excepting the homestead
from the operation of the mechanics' lien and also because many
states have exceptions in their constitution and were merely following the mandate of the constitution when passing an exception
statute.
Then, of course, arguments, and seemingly strong arguments,
can be made from the policies and purposes underlying both statutes. On the mechanics' lien side, estoppel often enters the picture.
Implied exception usually arises here also. On the homestead side
there is the age-old and very strong principle of preserving the
family home. Another consideration that perhaps warrants mentioning is that the homestead entryman is often not the villain in
the picture. More often than not, the small contractor, who is the
homeowner's agent by reason of our mechanics' lien law, is the
person who was paid by the homeowner and suddenly found himself without funds. In such a case, which of the two innocent parties
should bear the loss? To this writer, the equities and arguments
appear to be in favor of the homestead.
V.

ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND PROBLEM

A. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
These provisions are, of course, the same. Some of the particular
sections of the statutes will be more important, but the inquiry is
directed to the same two statutory rights.
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B. New Elements
Two new elements come into play at this point. First, there is
the relation back theory of the mechanics' lien. That is, the Colorado statute provides that all liens established by virtue of the mechanics' lien laws shall relate back to the time of the commencement of work under the contract, or if the contract be not in writing to the time of the commencement of the work upon the structure or improvement.8 8 As far as the materialman is concerned it
has been held that the date of the lien relates back to the time the
first of the materials were furnished.8 9 The other new element that
comes into play is the judicial construction of the homestead law
to the effect that the homestead is valid against judgment liens if
entered before the lien becomes specific, i.e., before a levy of an
execution or attachment."
These new elements in conjunction with the assumption that
the homestead is superior to the mechanics' lien, if filed before the
mechanics' lien is perfected and foreclosed on, bring about the new
problem. At what point in time will the designation of the land as
a homestead defeat the operation of the mechanics' lien? More specifically, does the relation back theory cause the mechanics' lien to
defeat a homestead entry which was recorded subsequent to the
commencement of the work but before actual levy on the property?
Here again the particular wording of the statutes is important.
It appears from the wording of the mechanics' lien statutes that the
lien would attach as of the date when the work was commenced or
the material was furnished and would operate against the homestead. However, there still seems to be some question due to the fact
that the statute says that the mechanics' lien relates back to that
date and "shall have priority over any and every lien or encumbrance subsequently intervening."' 1 Does it then relate back only
as against other liens or also for the purpose of defeating a possible
claim of homestead?
C. The General Rule
The general rule appears to be highly in favor of the mechanics'
lien in a problem such as this. Very positive statements have been
made to this effect. In 18 Ruling Case Law, in a discussion on the
homestead as a subject of the mechanics' lien, the author said,
"Some of the states allow the right to a lien, while others deny it;
but even under the rule of absolute exemption an existing mechanics' lien or one which is inchoate by virtue of a contract to supply
materials, etc., cannot be defeated by the subsequent acquisition of
2
a homestead in the property."9

In Corpus Juris it is stated that "while in some jurisdictions
the rule is otherwise, or at least subject to limitations or modifications, the general rule is that the exemption cannot be claimed as
against valid liens which have attached to the premises before they
are impressed with the homestead character, whether such liens
88 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 86-3-6 (1953).
89 Meller v. Valentine, 3 Colo. 255 (1877).
90 Sterling Nat'l Bank v. Francis, 78 Colo. 204, 240 Pac. 945 (1925); Edson-Keith Co. v. Bedwell,
52 Colo. 310, 122 Pac. 392 (1912); Weare v. Johnson, 20 Colo. 363, 38 Pac. 374 (1894); Woodward
v. People's Nat'l Bank, 2 Colo. App. 369, 31 Pac. 184 (1892).
91 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 86-3-6 (1953).
92 18 R.C.L. 888.
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are obtained by contract or operation of law." 3 This article goes
on to say that the rule has been applied in case of liens created by
mechanics' liens.24 As a further indication of the superiority of the
mechanics' lien it is stated in Corpus Juris Secundum, that "the
question whether particular property is a homestead, with respect
to such a lien, is generally determined as of the time of the making
of the contract under which the labor was performed or the materials were furnished. .

..-

'

In light of some of the Colorado deci-

sions this, in itself, practically answers the question.
D. Other State Decisions
The case law is almost universally behind the rule that subsequent acquisition of a homestead will not defeat a mechanics' lien.
This rule was announced in Evans v. Jensen, 6 where the court declared that notwithstanding the constitutional provision that the
"legislature shall provide by law for selection by each head of a
family an exemption of a homestead . . . from sale on execution,"

a pre-existing mechanics' lien is not affected by the subsequent
acquisition of a homestead right in the property. In Davies-Henderson Lumber Co. v. Gottschalk17 the theory of relation back was
used as an alternative basis for the decision in favor of the mechanics' lien. In that case the defendant argued that, as the law stood
at the time the material was furnished, a claim for material could
no' attach to a homestead. The court held that a complete answer
to this contention was that the lien must be held to relate to the
time of furnishing the material, and at that time the homestead was
not in existence.
One case stands out strongly in favor of the homestead in this
type of situation, but it stands nearly alone. The court in this case
appears to base its opinion primarily on the procedure required to
foreclose on a mechanics' lien. In declaring the homestead to be
superior, the court said "it is still necessary to foreclose such a lien
by suit in which a decree is rendered as in other suits for such purposes. The decree thus rendered is not different from others in its
effect upon the property, and there being no exception in the homestead laws in favor of such determination, it affects them in the
-:3 29
1)4 Id.
',557
9651
07 81

C.J. Homesteads § 202 (1922).
at Sec. 202.
C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 14 (1948).
Utah 1, 168 Pac. 762 (1917).
Cal. 641, 22 Pac. 860 (1889).
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same manner as in other judgments or decrees. The operation of
the statute under consideration is not to impair the lien, but only
to suspend its execution,
and then only at the claim of the owner
98
of the homestead."
Another case which speaks for the homestead is Walsh v. McMenomy. 99 In this case work was done and material was furnished.
Subsequently, but before judgment, a homestead was declared. At
that time California had excepted mechanics and laborers from the
homestead exemption but not materialmen. However, by statute
the materialman's lien related back. In this case the court held that
a subsequent acquisition of a homestead would defeat the materialman's lien. As was mentioned before, these cases seem to constitute
a definite minority.
E. Colorado cases
Colorado cases shed some light on this problem, and seem to
favor the mechanics' lien. Some weight, however, is cast in the direction of the homestead by cases speaking of the purpose of the
designation of a homestead. It has been held that the causing of
"homestead" to be entered in the margin was not for "the purpose
of giving notice and securing protection to those dealing with the
householder and extending credit to him."'1 0 Therefore it seems
arguable that the mechanic is not warranted in relying on the debtor's declining to avail himself of the homestead privilege. However,
later in the same case the court held that "the householder is in
ample time if he records the election before a lien attaches in favor
of his creditor."'' 1 (Emphasis supplied.)
The last statement quoted along with the statement of the court
in Trich v. Norton 0 2 that "the lien of the mechanic or materialman
begins with the commencement of the work or the furnishing of
the material under his express or implied contract with his employer, and attaches upon whatever estate the latter may have at
the commencement of such work, or the furnishing of materials, . . ." seems to make the position of the homestead claimant
nearly untenable.
Other cases however still raise some question. For example, it
has been held that in order to declare priority of a lien over the
homestead entry, the land must have been subjected to the lien
prior to the assertion of the homestead.' 0 ' The question is, what
does the court mean by "subjected to"?
The case which seems to establish the superiority of the mechanic in a problem like this is McPhee v. O'Rourke.'1 4 This case
was discussed to a certain extent in the analysis of the first problem. To review the facts briefly the more important points are that
no mechanics' lien was filed, judgment was obtained for material
furnished, and a homestead was filed subsequent to the time of furnishing the material. The critical words were uttered regarding the
question of whether a homestead should operate against a claim for
material used in improvements before the property was designated
9., Joh,-on .. Tucker, 85 Ore. 646, 167 Pac. 787 (1917).
99 74 Col. 356, 16 Pac. 17 (1887).
10 Barrett v. Knight, 7 Colo. 365, 3 Pac. 747 (1884).
101 Id. at 369. 3 Pac. at 748.
102 10 Colo. 337, 15 Pac. 680 (1887).
103 Howell v. Burch Warehouse & Transfer Co., 100 Colo. 247, 67 P.2d 73 (1937).
104 McPhee v. O'Rourke, 10 Colo. 301, 15 Pac. 420 (1887).
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as a homestead. The court's reply was in the affirmative, saying that
"by failing to take the steps necessary to secure a lien upon the
premises, under the provisions of our mechanics' lien act, the right
to subject the premises to such debt was lost." The question which
was raised earlier regarding this statement was whether it was
indicating that a mechanics' lien would be superior to a homestead
whenever the homestead was filed or whether it was indicating that
in this case it would be sufficient since the relation back theory
would cause the lien to ante date the designation of the homestead.
However, it seems that whatever the court was indicating is of little
concern regarding this problem since either construction would
cause the homestead to be subject to the mechanics' lien whenever
the homestead was subsequently acquired.
The only thing that detracts from the overwhelming weight of
this case in favor of the mechanics' lien in the second problem is
that the statement quoted was dictum since no mechanics' lien was
ever filed. However, this would not seem likely to detract much.
F. Conclusion on Second Problem
Various points have been raised to favor either the mechanics'
lien or the homestead. The strongest points for the homestead seem
to be that:
1. The statute and the cases say that the mechanics' lien relates
back for the purpose of establishing priority of the lien over
other liens and encumbrances. This leaves the question of
whether the homestead is a lien or encumbrance.
2. The purpose of making a marginal entry is not to give a
potential creditor notice and, any creditor deals with the
debtor knowing that the debtor can avail himself of the
homestead privilege any time before actual and specific levy
of an execution or attachment.
3. As stated in the Oregon case 0 5 the mechanics' lien must be
foreclosed on in the same manner as other decrees. Therefore, it could be argued that as against a homestead the
mechanics' lien is the same as any other judgment.
The points which seem to favor the mechanics' lien are:
1. Most of the authorities flatly state that subsequent acquisition of a homestead will not defeat the mechanics' lien.
2. The majority of the states have held the mechanics' lien
superior in such cases.
3. The Colorado cases seem to indicate that the mechanics' lien
actually attaches as of the date of commencement of work
and furnishing of materials.
4. The McPhee case' 0 6 seems to establish that, for whatever
reason, the homestead would not be superior.
To this writer not only the reasoning but the equities seem to favor
the mechanic in a case such as this.
V.

CONCLUSION

It has been the purpose of this article to bring to light unsolved
questions which seem to exist regarding two statutory rights. It
may be asked why these questions have not been raised before.
10.5 See note 98 supro.
106 See note 104 supro.
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There are several possible reasons. One reason might be that in
order for either of these problems to arise it takes a particular factual situation which might not often occur. There has to be a low
valuation on the house since the homestead exemption only extends
to $5,000.00. Also, it would have to be an addition rather than the
original construction. Another possible reason is that there is often
not enough money involved to warrant an appeal. Finally, it seems
likely that if much money is involved, bank financing would be required and this would nearly always include a written waiver of
the homestead exemption.
Whatever the reason the questions seem never to have reached
the Colorado Supreme Court. If and when they do, it appears that
at least the first of the two problems will require a great deal of
"balancing of the equities."
APPENDIX A
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

State

General
Provision
For Homestead

Specific
Provision
For Homestead

§ §205, 206

Ala.

Art. 10,

Ark.

Art. 9, §3

Ariz.
Calif.
Colo.
Conn.
Del.
Fla.

Excepts mechanics' liens on premises.
Art. 10, §207
Excepts laborers'
or mechanics'
liens. Case law
says lumber furnished gives mechanics' lien and
is excepted.
Art. 9, §3

Art. 17, §1
Art. XVIII, §1

Art. X, §1
Art. IX, §1

Hawaii
Idaho
Ill.

Exceptions

Art. IV.
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Art. X, S1, mechanics' liens.
Art. IX, §1 gives
G e n. Assembly
authority to provide for waiver,
encumbrance, alienation.
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State

General
Provision
For Homestead

Specific
Provision
For Homestead

Exceptions

Provision for exemption of a reas o n able amount
of real property.
No actual homestead provision.
Iowa
Kansas

Art. XV, §9

Art. XV, §9, Mechanics' liens.
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State

General
Provision
For Homestead

Maine
Md.

Mass.
Mich.

Nebr.
Nev.

N.H.
N.J.
N.M.
N.Y.
N. C.
N. Dak.

XL

Exceptions

Art. XI, §1

Laborers' 1 i e n s
Art. XI, §2

Art. III, §44 Legislature to
provide for exemption of reas o n able amount
of property from
execution.

Mechanics' liens
Art. III, §44

Art. XIV, §2
Same as Maryland. To be determined by law.
Art. I, §12

Minn.

Miss.
Mo.
Mont.

Specific
Provision
For Homestead

Vlor

Both laborers'
and materialmen's liens Art. I,
§ 12

Art. XIX, §4,
same as Colo.
Right of debtor to
be recognized by
law (reasonable
amount of property) Art. I, §14

Art. IV, §30

Art. X, §1

Laborers' 1 i e n s
Art. X, §1
Laborers' and
material men's
Art. XVII, §208

Right of debtor
be recognized by
law. Art. XVII,
§208

Ohio
Okla.
Ore.
Penn.
R.I.
S.C.

Art. XII, § § 1, 3

S.D.

Right of debtor to
be recognized by
law. Art. XXI, §4

Art. III, §28

§2, 3,
Art. XII,
work on premises

Art. III, §28 For
erection or making of improvements.
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Homestead
Provision

Exception For
Mechanics' Lien
Homestead in
value in all of
$1,000 to be exempt. Art. XI, §11
Art. XVI, §51

Tenn.

Tex.

The Exception
Includes
Materialmen
Debts contracted
for improvement.
Art. XI, §II
Debts for work
and materials in
con s tructing
home. Art. XVI,
§50

Art. XXII, §1

Utah
Vt.

Real and personal
property to value
not exceeding
$2,000 to be exempt.
Art. XIV, §190
Legislature to
protect by law
certain portion of
homestead. Art.
XIX, §1
Homestead to be
exempt.
Art. VI, §48

Va.

Wash.

W. Va.

Right of debtor to
be recognized by
law. Art. I, §17
Homestead to be
exempt from
forced sale.
Art. XIX, §1

Wis.
Wyo.

Laborers' or mechanics' liens.
Art. XIV, §190

Debts for erection of improvements. Art. VI,

§48

Art. XIX, §1

APPENDIX B
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Ala.
Ariz.

Title 7, §625
Title 33, §1101

Ark.

Provides details
for claiming.
C.C. § 1240
C.C. §1241

Calif.

Title 7, §627
Title 33, §33-1103
as amended,
Laws of 1959.
Only if mechanics' lien attached
b e f ore property
was claimed as a
homestead.

Yes
Yes
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State

Colo.
Conn.
Del.
Fla.
Ga.
Idaho
Ill.
Ind.
Iowa

Kansas
Ky.
La.
Maine
Md.
Mass.
Mich.

Minn.
Miss.
Mo.
Mont.
Nebr.
Nev.
N.H.
N.M.
N.J.
N.Y.
N. C.
N.D.
Ohio
Okla.
Ore.
Penn.
R. I.

Homestead
Provision

Exception For
Mechanics' Lien

VOL.

The Exception
Includes
Materialmen

C.R.S. 77-3-1
§222.01
Title 51, §51-101 Title 51, §51-101
Chap. 10, §55-1001 Chap. 10, §55-1005
Chap. 82, §3
Chap. 35, §1
Lien Chapter
Chap. 35, §2-3501 Chap. 35, §2-3515
Real estate exemption.
Chap. 561, §1-20 Chap. 561, §21 (3)
Details for constitutional p r o v ision.
Chap. 60, Art. 35, Chap. 60, Art. 35,
§3501
§3501
Chap. 427, §427.- Chap. 427, §427.060
060
Title 20, §1
Details of claiming.
Chap. 112, §71
Chap. 112, §68
Chap. 188, §1
Title 27, §27.1572 Title 26, §26.282
Requires contract
by
in writing
both husband and
wife.
Chap. 510, §510.01 §510.01
Chap. 3, §317
Chap. 3, §327
Title 35, §513.475
Title 33, §33-104 Title 33, §33-105
Chap. 40, §40-101 Chap. 40, §40-103
Chap. 115, §115- Chap. 115, §115010
040
Chap. 480, §4
Chap. 480, §4 (II)
Chap. 24, §24-6-1 Chap. 24, §24-6-1

Chap. 47, §47-1801
Title 23, §2329.73
Title 31, §1
Title 2, §23.240

Chap. 47, §47-1801(1)
Title 23, §2329.72
Title 31, §5 (3)
Title 2, §23.260
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Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

By case law.
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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Homestead
Provision

Exception For
Mechanics' Lien

Utah

Title 34, §34.1
Title 34, §34-62
Chap. 51-17, §51- Exception in favor of homestead
1701
in mechanics' lien
Chapter. §39.0702
Chap. 3, §26.301 Chap. 3, §26-307
§3833
§3839 - must be
in writing.
Title 28, Chap. 1,

Vt.

Title 27, §101

S.C.
S.D.
Tenn.
Tex.

Va.
Wash.
W. Va.

Wis.
Wyo.
Alaska
Hawaii

The Exception
Includes
Materialmen
Yes

Yes
Yes

§28-1-1

Title 9, §1927 Mechanics' lien Chapter says provisions of this chapter shall apply
to homesteads.
Title 34, §34-5 (2)
Title 34, §34-4
§6.12.010
§6.12.010
Chap. 38, Art. 9, Chap. 38, Art. 9,
§3911
§3913
Chap. 272, §272.20 Chap. 272, §272.20
Title 1, Chap. 21, (Mechanics' Lien
§ 1-498
Chapter) Title 29,
Chap. 2, §291-24
§22-1-6
Laws of 1957,
Chap. 61
§233-64
§233-64

COMPLIMENTS
OF

SYMES BUILDING

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

